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This article takes Brexit and Nigel Farage’s right-wing populism as a starting 
point to consider the populist politics of racism and antiracism. I demonstrate 
how two key figures of right-wing populist discourse – the “white working 
class” and the “liberal elite” – have come to describe a political grammar with 
a widespread influence and explanatory resonance across the political 
spectrum, and which have as a result formed a racial common sense in Brexit 
Britain. Rather than accept the terms of a debate that has been set by the 
populist right, I draw on Ernesto Laclau to describe a rival politics of antiracist 
populism. Although it is far from straightforward to navigate, engagement on 
the terrain of the popular is not optional if we are to counter a fatalistic 
tendency to conceive of antiracism as a minority or elite concern. 
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Populist times
Populism is an important political force in the world today. Political elites in 
liberal-democratic nation-states are being challenged by a diversity of political 
actors who attest to represent the will of the people. Donald Trump’s claim to 
champion the interests of “ordinary American people” saw him wrongfooting 
the mighty party machines of both Democrats and Republicans all the way to 
the White House. In Europe, populist parties of the left have made significant 
gains in the aftermath of the European Debt Crisis, Alexis Tsipras’s Syriza 
promising to “destroy the oligarchy” and Pablo Iglesias’s Podemos to depose 
“La Casta”, Spain’s political elites (Mason 2015; Tremlett 2015). Right-wing 
populists, notably Geert Wilders’s Partij voor de Vrijheid and Marie Le Pen’s 
Rassemblement national (the rebooted Front National), have moved further 
into the political mainstream. Britain’s vote in June 2016 to leave the 
European Union is clearly part of this anti-establishment tendency, and Nigel 
Farage’s UKIP played a significant role in cultivating opposition to Britain and 
Europe’s “privileged elite” (Barnes 2016).
This article takes Brexit and Farage’s right-wing populism as a starting point 
to consider the populist politics of racism and antiracism. It takes seriously the 
idea that the populist moment we are currently experiencing in Britain is not a 
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temporary aberration, and that it is therefore necessary to consider the 
implications of populism for antiracist practice. Not only do antiracists need to 
oppose a political climate that feeds racism and xenophobia, they also need 
to get to grips with how populism has shaped the terms of antiracist struggle. 
My first objective is to demonstrate how two key figures of right-wing populist 
discourse – the “white working class” and the “liberal elite” – have come to 
describe a political grammar with a widespread influence and explanatory 
resonance across the spectrum of British politics. Exploring the “family 
resemblances” that connect right-wing populists, the Tories, and sections of 
the left, I suggest that the opposition between these two figures constitutes a 
racial common sense in Brexit Britain. To make a break with the political 
grammar of right-wing populism, I then contend that it is conceptually useful to 
differentiate between populism’s form and its content. Drawing on Ernesto 
Laclau’s theory of populism as a “political logic”, I argue that there are 
theoretically opportunities for the development of an antiracist populism that 
harnesses popular democratic desire to alternative political ends. Antiracists 
cannot ignore the rise of populism, and neither can they oppose it without 
reinforcing the idea that antiracism is itself the project of political elites. While 
the spectre of racialized nationalism continues to haunt populisms of the left 
as well as the right, I suggest that antiracist populism is a necessary heuristic 
to help us understand and act upon a changed terrain of political practice.
The populist racism of the Brexit vote 
The first point to acknowledge is the centrality of racism to the Brexit vote. 
Certainly, there were other factors involved, but Britain’s vote to leave Europe 
was in significant part due to the successful mobilization of anti-immigrant 
racism by the anti-establishment right. Just as Nigel Farage’s infamous 
“Breaking Point” poster ostensibly named Europe but depicted Syrian 
refugees in Slovenia, UKIP’s injunction to “break free of the EU and take back 
control of our borders” had a significant and undeniable racial subtext. Never 
mind the fact that the EU referendum did not remotely address the question of 
non-European migration, the anti-immigrant vote was, as has long been the 
case in Britain and across Europe (see Ford 2011), fostered less by antipathy 
to migrants per se than towards non-white immigrant groups in particular (see 
Hix et al. 2017). The visual rhetoric of much of the Brexit campaigning had 
been preceded by the widespread dissemination of images from the Calais 
“jungle”, having come to prominence in the summer of 2015 as a metonym for 
the European “refugee crisis” (see James, this issue), accompanied by tabloid 
headlines such as the Daily Express’s “Send in army to halt migrant invasion” 
(Reynolds 2015). The evocation of abject black and brown bodies 
jeopardising the integrity of Britain’s geographical borders was already a 
mainstay of tabloid media and right-wing political discourse. A conception of 
migrants as economic and security threats (Virdee and McGeever 2017) had 
been bolstered by recent government initiatives predicated on “a ratcheting up 
of anti-migrant feeling” including the “domestication” of border checks in 
workplaces, hospitals and banks (Jones et al. 2017). Although more 
“respectable” politicians found it expedient to distance themselves from the 
UKIP leader – reacting to the “Breaking Point” poster, Tory Brexiteer Boris 
Johnson responded “That’s not my politics and that’s not my campaign” 
(Zeffman 2016) – Farage’s influence came to dominate the EU referendum 
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debate. While there was nothing particularly novel about UKIP’s anti-
immigrant racism per se, what made Farage’s appeal distinctive was the way 
he set himself up against a political establishment. By drawing together an 
already well-established racist border politics with a forceful critique of political 
elites (directed both towards Brussels and an acquiescent Westminster), 
Farage was able to steer Brexit’s political coordinates. 
Before demonstrating something of the wider political resonances of this 
splicing together of racism and anti-elitism, I want to first set out in a little 
more detail the character of Farage’s confrontation between people and elite. 
While not always named directly, two rather more specific figures, set up in 
opposition to one another and both inflected by race, served to give shape 
and tone to his populist rhetoric: the “white working class” and the “liberal 
elite” (see, for example Farage 2018). The white working class are conceived 
as resistant to (non-white) immigration, while the liberal elite are deaf to their 
demands; the white working class are culturally conservative and threatened 
by cultural difference; the liberal elite celebrate and are enriched by 
multiculturalism. The white working class live in small towns and identify as 
English or British; the liberal elite live in the metropolis and identify as 
European and cosmopolitan. The white working class do not censor 
themselves and speak the truth about race; the liberal elite are transfixed by 
and seek to impose an agenda of political correctness. This opposition 
between the white working class and the liberal elite draws on an eclectic 
range of elements, combining issues of culture and lifestyle together with 
politics and ideology. Right-wing populists like Farage paint a vivid picture of 
two irreconcilable groups and the imbalance of power that exists between 
them: the liberal elite are small in number but large in influence; the white 
working class are large in number but powerless and disenfranchised. To 
remedy this inequity, right-wing populists propose a simple and neat solution: 
the liberal elite must be deposed and representatives of the people must be 
installed in power.
It is not hard to unpick the racial politics that is implicit to this framing. When 
Farage argues that immigration “has left the white working class, effectively, 
as an underclass” (in Wintour et al. 2014), he uses the language of racial 
difference to construct a category of identification and victimhood (see 
Emejulu 2016). In right-wing populist rhetoric, the “white working class” does 
not only give a name to a group of people, it also implicitly names the cause 
and agents of their subordination: immigrants and liberal elites. This causality 
embedded in the “white working class” references a time before its fall, a time 
apparently before “immigration”. It references the long-held but profoundly 
erroneous fantasy of Britain as a white nation, over which white people have 
some proprietorial claim (see also Abbas and Jones, both this issue). In 
addition, the figure of the “white working class” refuses an understanding of 
class that cuts across racial differences. Britain’s multicultural working class is 
hereby fragmented and repackaged so as to prioritise racial difference as a 
defining element of social conflict. The “white working class” is not, therefore, 
an innocent empirical description of an existing social group, but a partisan 
argument about race, proprietorship, entitlement, victimhood and 
displacement. 
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We can advance similar kinds of argument about the figure of the “liberal 
elite”, who in right-wing populist discourse are conceived as the relentless 
champions of immigration and proponents of multicultural diversity. It does not 
take much critical scrutiny to reveal the fictive nature of this “liberal elite”. 
Even the most laissez-faire of recent UK governments have presided over 
immigration regimes that have served to both stigmatise economic migrants 
and exploit their labour. State managers who go out of their way to stress their 
commitment to oppose racism and discrimination have frequently shown 
themselves to be apologists for it. Governing elites have certainly learned to 
speak a “progressive” language of race, but however well intentioned their 
antiracism is frequently inadequate and self-serving.
By defining political elites by their supposed social liberalism, the discourse of 
right-wing populism reinforces a false dichotomy in the politics of race. It 
reproduces a conception of antiracism that is imposed, top down, on a 
reluctant and prejudiced population. In doing so, it removes from view the 
hospitable, convivial, “unheralded multiculture” (Gilroy 2004, 108) that has 
long been part of the fabric of British working class life. Such framings sideline 
quotidian forms of antiracist politics and solidarity, and write out of the story 
the central role played in the antiracist struggle by minority communities 
themselves. Indeed, one of the most notable features of right-wing populists’ 
rhetorical opposition of the figure of the “white working class” to the figure of 
the “liberal elite” is the virtual absence of anyone who is not racialised as 
white. While racialised minorities are central to right-wing populist discourse, 
they exist only to describe the antagonism between both groups. If right-wing 
populism adapts Orwell’s characterisation of the nation as a “family with the 
wrong members in control” (Orwell 1941), then we should also note that it 
conceives of this family as intrinsically white.
Family resemblances
So much might be considered par for the course from right-wing populists like 
Farage. What is more remarkable is the extent of right-wing populism’s 
political influence. Consider the rapidity with which the leadership of the Tory 
Party reframed its stance at their party conference some four months after the 
Brexit vote. Attempting to put some distance between herself and her 
predecessor David Cameron – not to mention her own pre-vote association 
with the Remain campaign – Theresa May spoke of a sense “that many 
people have today that the world works well for a privileged few, but not for 
them”, and that “too many people in positions of power behave as though they 
have more in common with international elites than with people down the 
road”. Summarising this populist affiliation to “the people” against the elite, 
May insisted that “if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen 
of nowhere”. May addressed “the public”, who she defined in opposition to 
politicians and commentators who, she argued, “find your patriotism 
distasteful, your concerns about immigration parochial, your views about 
crime illiberal, your attachment to your job security inconvenient.” (May 2016; 
see also Stewart and Walker 2017). 
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While May’s populist turn was evidently an accommodation to the direction of 
political travel that had been established by UKIP, it is striking to note the 
extent to which the same variety of political rhetoric – counterposing local 
publics with “international elites”, and returning repeatedly to the theme of 
immigration and national identity – was adopted across a wide political 
spectrum as an analysis of the Brexit political conjuncture. Take, for example, 
the premise that animates David Goodhart’s The Road to Somewhere, which 
sets up an opposition between “Somewheres”, socially conservative and 
geographically-bound, and “Anywheres”, that cosmopolitan liberal elite 
(Goodhart 2017). In the analysis of Eric Kaufmann (2017), popular opposition 
to immigration is a legitimate expression of “racial self-interest” erroneously 
policed by the antiracist moralism of liberal elites. It became exceedingly 
common after the Brexit vote for political analysis to share the diagnosis – if 
not the beliefs – of right-wing populists. 
Of particular interest here is the way that the right-wing populist opposition of 
“white working class” and “liberal elite” have been echoed by some in the 
Labour party. Consider the response to the Brexit vote by centre-left Labour 
politician Andy Burnham. While critical of the explicit racism of the far right, 
Burnham argues that Labour activists need to “take back control of the 
immigration debate” by listening to and not dismissing “public concerns” out of 
a fear of “pandering to UKIP”. Again, right-wing populists are credited with 
expressing an authentic popular desire, and Labour activists are framed as 
thwarted by their own political correctness, left “avoiding people’s eyes and 
shuffling away” (Burnham 2016). If Burnham unintentionally takes for granted 
the political grammar of right-wing populism, there have been indications that 
the perceived popular purchase of anti-immigrant positions have at times also 
inflected the actions of the Labour leadership in its triangulations over Brexit. 
Jeremy Corbyn’s advocacy of a “migrant impact fund” (Corbyn 2016) framed 
an underfunding problem as a migrant problem, while an abrupt U-turn over 
Labour’s opposition to the 2019 Brexit immigration bill (Stewart 2019) 
demonstrates ongoing equivocation over the question of free movement. 
Other Labour politicians have drawn more explicitly on a racialized discourse, 
defending the “white working class” against a range of straw targets beloved 
of right-wing populists: Stephen Kinnock has called for “an end to identity 
politics” and “obsessing about diversity” in order to “stand up for … the white 
working class” (Simons 2016), while Angela Raynor has argued that initiatives 
to tackle gender and race discrimination have “actually had a negative impact 
on the food chain [for] white working boys” (Nelson 2018). In a recent survey 
of the racialization of the white working class, Aurélien Mondon and Aaron 
Winter note how the ‘white working class’ has become ‘a reactionary proxy for 
the embodiment of the “people”’ (Mondon and Winter 2018, 2), with analyses 
highlighting the decline, vulnerability and victimization of the “white working 
class” increasingly common amongst sections of the British left.1 Similarly, 
Malcolm James and Sivamohan Valluvan (2018) take to task a “conflation of 
essentialised, fetishised whiteness with working-class struggle and anti-
capitalism” in left-nationalist arguments around Brexit. Notwithstanding the 
novel features of the Brexit political conjuncture, there are clear continuities 
here with a far longer history on the left of “racialized identity politics” (Virdee 
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2019, 19-21). Some of the key operating assumptions of right-wing populist 
rhetoric – involving a nativist conception of “the people” and a concern about 
their displacement by immigrants and minorities – have a long history in the 
Labour movement and came to be institutionalised in social policy and the 
British welfare state (see Lewis 1996; Paul 1997; Knowles 1992; Virdee 
2014). 
There are, to summarise, a range of family resemblances that have allowed 
right-wing populist rhetoric to resonate right across the political spectrum. 
Farage’s opposition of the “liberal elite” to the “white working class” was part 
of an exemplary populist manoeuvre that Theresa May’s Tories had little 
choice but to follow, despite the performative contradictions and self-inflicted 
wounds this entailed for Britain’s ruling party. But this populist analysis has 
had a wider explanatory traction, amongst journalists and commentators, and 
significantly amongst Labour politicians too. On the face of it, Brexit did 
highlight an exceedingly stark divide: the National Centre for Social Research 
counterposes the category of “middle class liberals”, who voted 92% remain, 
with the category of “economically deprived anti-immigration”, who voted 95% 
leave (Swales 2016, 25). Yet these classifications represent extreme fractions 
of the British population and detract from the fact that the Brexit vote was 
“disproportionately delivered by the propertied, pensioned, well-off, white 
middle class” (Bhambra 2017, 215). Like other awkward statistics – for 
example, that three quarters of generally poorer BME voters elected to remain 
(Begum 2018) – these facts have been sidelined in political commentary and 
analysis by the simplifications of an engaging story about the white working 
class, the question of immigration, and the interests of a liberal elite. A very 
particular story about race has come to dominate in the Brexit political 
conjuncture, in which certain categories of subject have been given 
excessively large roles. 
The political logic of populism
In the first part of this article I sketched out the political grammar of right-wing 
populism, acknowledging its influence and explanatory resonance across the 
spectrum of British politics in the Brexit political conjuncture. In this section, I 
want to draw on Ernesto Laclau’s definition of populism as a “political logic” 
(Laclau 2005a, 117) as a resource to develop an alternative set of critical 
perspectives, and to unsettle and render contingent the widely naturalised 
rhetoric of right-wing populism. Rather than take right-wing populists at their 
word and accept a fundamental antagonism between the “white working 
class” and the “liberal elite” over race and immigration, it becomes possible, I 
suggest, to envisage rival forms of populist politics. An anti-racist response to 
the rise of right-wing populism in Britain needs to be sceptical of and resistant 
to taking on understanding of “the people” moulded in the image of the far 
right: essentially the idea that significant sections of the British people, and 
particularly the working classes, are intrinsically racist. I will not dispute this 
interpretation on empirical grounds – it is easy enough to find examples of 
racism, and easy enough to show how racist hate crime has risen in the Brexit 
conjuncture, as numerous national and regional figures attest (Corcoran and 
Smith 2016). Rather I will argue that to get to grips with right-wing populism, 
antiracism must involve itself in the contestation of the category of “the 
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people”. Antiracist populism thus becomes a way of breaking with the political 
grammar of right-wing populism and its entrenchment in British politics. In 
making this largely theoretical argument I stop well short of delineating a 
developed political programme, and I readily acknowledge that the left’s 
nationalist investments that I have sketched above continue to pose some 
significant challenges to its development. My interest here in rethinking race 
and populism from first principles is largely heuristic, intended to show how it 
is important for antiracists to prevent right-wing populists from setting the 
terms of the debate around race and immigration. To tackle right-wing 
populism, I will go on to argue, it is necessary to be alert to how populism has 
come to shape what we what we mean and understand by antiracist practice.
In Laclau’s reading populism is not by definition nationalist, racist or anti-
immigrant: such characteristics are simply particular to the right-wing 
populism espoused by the likes of UKIP. Indeed, as far as Laclau is 
concerned populism does not have any necessary characteristics at all – 
racism is simply an “ontic” content that can be substituted for an infinite 
variety of other contents, each (theoretically at least) as contingent as the 
next. What’s significant about populism as a political logic is not its ontic 
content but its ontological form: an appeal to the popular defines a “frontier of 
exclusion” between “the people” and their political antagonists (2005a, 81). In 
Laclau’s reading the political logic of populism is therefore constitutive of 
politics per se. Populism does not describe just the activities of the far right, 
but that of all actors who seek to determine the trajectory of popular will. In its 
simplest formulation, populism describes the way in which political identities 
get established in relation to a constitutive outside (an excluded element 
which gives political identities shape and meaning by resembling and standing 
for what they are not). Populism names the process by which differences give 
way to common cause: the way an otherwise heterogeneous people cohere in 
the pursuit of a mutual set of interests and against that constitutive outside. To 
act politically is to play a part in shaping this process, of working to establish 
these interests as common.2
While we may want to look elsewhere to interpret the particular “content” of 
right-wing populism, the political logic of populism can help us to understand 
the broader context of its emergence in Brexit Britain. As has been widely 
recognized in left analysis (see, for example, Mouffe 2005a; 2005b; 2018; 
Yilmaz 2016; Mondon 2013), mainstream political parties in liberal democratic 
states have increasingly converged around a neoliberal agenda that has 
proven to be both depoliticizing and antidemocratic. Managerial elites have 
made decisions according to market-friendly protocols and precepts that have 
served to distance them from the terrain of political accountability. Though it is 
axiomatic in liberal democracies that political parties make some kind of claim 
to uniqueness in representing the will of the people, neoliberal convergence 
dampens parties’ distinctiveness and places emphasis on their common 
identity. As elsewhere, the centrist consensus in Britain has precipitated 
withdrawal from and widespread cynicism towards Westminster politics 
(“they’re all the same”), and it is into this breach that right-wing populists like 
Nigel Farage have recently stepped. Right-wing populism is, in Chantal 
Mouffe’s analysis, “the consequence of the post-political consensus” (Mouffe 
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2005b, 51). The fact that the anti-establishment energies unleashed by 
Farage’s UKIP were subsequently drawn upon by Theresa May’s 
establishment Tories is not a contradiction in terms: in accordance with 
Laclau’s reading, the political logic of populism is not the sole preserve of 
political outsiders, but may be drawn on by anyone capable of making a 
successful appeal to “the people” (see Moffitt 2016, 47-8; Pauwels 2014, 
184).
In noting the significant racist dimension of the Brexit vote, antiracist critique  
needs to be cautious about accepting without question an inevitable 
association between racism and populism. The causal logic operative in 
Farage’s argument implies that they are closely correlated (a managerial 
political elite are deaf to the popular demand to reduce immigration and 
restore the racial sovereignty of white Britons), but it is conceptually useful 
here to distinguish between populism’s form (its evocation of a people against 
a political establishment) and its content (its anti-immigrant racism). 
I want to do this first to elaborate the possibility that derives, as shown above, 
from Laclau’s theory of populism: there is no necessary relationship between 
form and content here, and that it would have been possible – if not in these 
specific political circumstances, then in slightly different ones – to develop a 
populist appeal to the people against elites grounded in an alternative content 
(a more progressive iteration might have focused on political elites’ 
capitulation to multinational finance capital, say, or their collusion in the 
impoverishment of education, healthcare or social security over the last 
decade of political austerity). I make this theoretical point not in order to claim 
that alternative populisms would in June 2016 have necessarily been a viable 
alternative to Brexit’s racist nationalism (there is surely little doubt that the 
racist right had very much the upper hand here). I am merely interested in 
establishing the possibility of anti-elitist populisms grounded in different 
content – that it is plausible that a protest might be developed against 
unresponsive political elites around a different issue, or set of issues. The 
most cursory reading of political history can furnish any number of examples 
where this has happened, from the scale of revolutions and anticolonial 
struggles to that of parish councils: an appeal to the suppressed will of the 
people is, as Laclau insists, “the political operation par excellence” (Laclau 
2005a, 153). The democratic inadequacies of Britain’s political system mean 
that the perennial nativist complaint about having “never been asked” about 
immigration can be easily applied to an infinite range of other topics. At a 
moment when the political grammar of right-wing populism has such a 
powerful explanatory grip, Laclau provides an important reminder that popular 
desire is never given, but always the subject of political contestation.
The idea that populist form might have alternative contents gives us a 
different way of approaching of the right-wing populism of Brexit. By breaking 
with the causal association between form and content that right-wing populists 
set up – that anti-immigrant racism is the suppressed will of the people – it 
becomes possible to disarticulate one from the other. When anti-immigrant 
racism is accordingly understood as only one possible content describing this 
suppressed will, we can begin to think of rival contents to fill out the form of 
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popular desire. Besides the possibility of giving populist form an alternative 
content, the disarticulation of form and content enables us to consider that 
part of populism’s attraction might in fact relate to its formal qualities. Given 
that anti-immigrant racism in British politics long precedes the intervention of 
Farage and UKIP, it follows that we should consider their status as political 
outsiders as significant to the Brexit political conjuncture. 
To put this another way: why should we go along with the fatalistic notion that 
it is racism that comes first in Brexit’s intoxicating blend of racism and 
populism? Instead, can we not entertain the possibility that Brexit’s populist 
form (the nascent democratic desire to have one’s voice heard and taken into 
account) might have some appeal beyond the particular content (racism) with 
which it is expressed? I am not trying to suggest that form trumps content and 
that we can therefore straightforwardly substitute antiracism for racism as if 
the racist content of Brexit populism was entirely incidental to its appeal. 
Rather, my argument is that if we can attribute even one small portion of the 
appeal of Brexit populism to the populist form rather than the racist content – 
that if even a tiny scrap of the electoral appeal of Brexit was towards an idea 
of democratic sovereignty and self-determination, expressed in frustration at 
the neoliberal political consensus – then it becomes possible to reject racism 
as a fait accompli and pursue a political agenda that seeks to harness the 
populist form to a rival (“non-racist”, or, better, antiracist) content. This is what 
Mouffe calls the “democratic nucleus” (2018, 22) at the core of populist 
protest.
Once we have broken with the claimed causal association between the form 
and content of right-wing populism, we begin to undermine the notion that 
right-wing populists like Farage are simply giving voice to some intrinsic and 
heartfelt conviction amongst the people of Britain, as if “tensions around 
immigration are natural, prepolitical reflexes” (Yilmaz 2016, 6). Rather than 
adhere to a model of politics that conceives of “the will of the ‘people’ as 
something that was constituted before representation” (Laclau 2005a, 163-4), 
Laclau’s theory of populism insists that the people and their demand emerge 
at the same moment. Thus “political practices do not express the nature of 
social agents but, instead, constitute the latter” (Laclau 2005b, 33). Political 
representation is, as Jan-Werner Müller attests, “a dynamic, two-way process, 
not a matter of reproducing some social and cultural reality that is always 
already out there” (Müller 2016). In this reading, Brexit racism is not the 
repressed organic desire of the British people that had just been waiting for a 
figure like Farage to come along to give it voice. Rather, Brexit racism is in 
part at least the creation of Farage and his political allies (who are of course 
not making original arguments but are drawing on long-established reserves 
of racist nationalism in British political culture). Brexit racism is formed through 
Farage’s appeal to represent the people’s will, supported in great part by all 
those other actors right across the political spectrum and in Britain’s news 
media who take the far right at their word and accept without question the 
proposition that on some level the British people are intrinsically racist.3 Such 
an observation does not mitigate the force of Brexit racism – it is no less racist 
on account of it being politically confected; its effects are not less real. But it 
does undermine the causal logic according to which Farage is simply the 
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spokesperson for an already-existing popular desire. The political logic of 
populism encourages us to recognize the contingency of the relationship 
between “the people”, their political representatives, and the demands that 
appear to seamlessly join them together in common cause.
By understanding the association between racism and the people as a 
hegemonic manoeuvre – the establishment of a “common sense” in British 
politics – it is possible to begin to grasp how disabling this might be to the 
development of an effective antiracist alternative. The accepted racial 
common sense of our time suggests that liberal elites have betrayed the will 
of ordinary socially conservative people, and that the answer to right-wing 
populism is to give credence to their concerns about immigration as if these 
emerge, sui generis, without the concerted symbiotic collusion of diverse 
political actors. This racial common sense gestures towards only two political 
options: either politicians must listen to and incorporate the people’s concerns 
(the populist option; historically pursued most often by Tory administrations), 
or they must prevent the expression of popular racism by its containment and 
distraction (the elitist option; historically pursued most often by Labour 
administrations). Both of these options have been a mainstay of racial 
governance since the great populist intervention of Powellism in the late 
1960s and early 1970s (see Hall, 2017), and while from one perspective they 
seem to indicate very different kinds of race politics (the appeasement of 
racism versus the protection of racialized minorities), their shared racial 
common sense – that the people are racist – describes an underlying 
conceptual unity. According to the racial common sense that preceded, 
dominated and succeeded the Brexit vote, antiracist populism is a 
contradiction in terms: political actors have the option of either listening to, or 
of suppressing, the racist will of the people. 
To question the authenticity of this political diagnosis does not require us to 
downplay racism’s hold in Brexit Britain. Insofar as the abiding racial common 
sense cultivates and encourages it, racism remains an indisputable fact of 
national life. And yet it is surely possible to hold at one and the same time to 
two descriptions of the British people: The first, largely empirical assessment, 
presents us with a descriptive and critical account of actually-existing racisms, 
their popular currency, and their embeddedness in the social. The second, 
largely theoretical assessment, is aimed at the contestation of the terrain of 
“the people” and does not and cannot for strategic political reasons accept the 
damning finality that almost invariably accompanies the first. To suggest that 
there might be a populism that could work to antiracist ends is to delineate an 
alternative to the racist double-bind of Britain’s racial common sense. To be 
effective, such a populism must reject the self-fulfilling proposition that the 
people are racist, and begin to construct a popular identity using a different 
set of assumptions. As I have already indicated, to invest in a notion of “the 
people” as intrinsically racist is to reinforce a profoundly contestable picture of 
British society: it is based on a fantasy of white proprietorship, it homogenises 
Britain’s multicultural working class, it exaggerates the antiracism of elites, 
downplays quotidian forms of antiracist struggle, and renders invisible and 
voiceless minority communities themselves. By highlighting the contingency of 
right-wing populism’s confident claim to represent the will of “the people” I 
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want to suggest that there are other ways in which “the people” could be 
imagined and politically mobilized which do not build on a racist kernel. The 
starting point of antiracist populism would be to seek to fill the populist form 
with a different kind of content, approaching “the people” as plural, egalitarian, 
and ethnically diverse.
Criticizing antiracist populism – the problem of nationalism
Critics of this outline of antiracist populism would be absolutely right to point 
out its largely theoretical and speculative character. Although I have borrowed 
from the advocates of left populism the idea that neoliberal post-politics is the 
catalyst of popular desire, I have stopped short of making a direct link 
between antiracist populism and left populism. I have not set out a political 
programme for antiracist populism or mapped out the social, political and 
cultural resources on which it might draw, and nor have I explored the 
potential for antiracist populism in Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party. Indeed, my 
account of the political grammar of right-wing populism has suggested that the 
explanatory resonances of “liberal elite” verus “white working class” are an 
ongoing problem in the racial politics of the British left.
My account is and will continue to be in large part a negative one, aimed at 
demonstrating what antiracism stands to lose by accepting the abiding racial 
common sense that “the people” are racist. Before I go on to give some 
specific examples that illustrate why I think antiracists need to contest the 
terrain of the popular, I want to first deal with the problem of nationalism. 
However useful Laclau’s theory is both to our understanding of the rise of 
right-wing populism and in illuminating a need to develop antiracism from a 
different starting point, it has long been subject to criticism from a race 
perspective. While there is much to learn from Laclau’s take on the abstract, 
formal political logic of populism, there is at times a temptation in its 
application to selectively foreground or background certain contextual 
conditions to suit the particular argument that is being made. In Stuart Hall’s 
reading, this is encouraged by a tendency in Laclau (and Mouffe) to “slip from 
the requirement to recognize the constraints of existing historical formations” 
(Hall in Grossberg 1996, 148). I note this as a self-criticism of the argument I 
have been making here: I have readily referenced the concrete conditions and 
circumstances of a dominant neoliberal political consensus as productive of 
populist energies, while so far sidestepping full acknowledgement of the unit 
or units of collective identification that describes “the people” of populist 
interpellation. We know that far right populists have the fantasy of a white 
nation to cohere an idea of the people against non-white immigrants, but what 
equivalent entity might serve an anti-racist populism? It is all very well to 
gesture towards a diverse and cosmopolitan populism-to-come, but what are 
the building blocks of such a political community? Without an answer to this 
question Laclau’s contribution is not a theory of politics as such so much as a 
theory of right-wing populism in particular. Does nationalism denature the very 
possibility of an antiracist populism? 
This is the criticism that was levelled at Laclau by Paul Gilroy back in the early 
1980s in his suggestion that, insofar as the nation is implicit to the formation 
of political identities in Britain, Laclau’s conception of the “the people” remains 
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a “racially specific” one (Gilroy 1982, 278). It is a criticism repeated more 
recently by Benjamin McKean (2016) who similarly argues that hierarchies of 
race within the nation prevent racialized minorities’ identification with a 
collective political entity, reminding us of the tendency of existing right-wing 
populisms to be constructed not against powerful elites but less powerful and 
less wealthy minority and migrant communities. Eric Fassin’s critique of left 
populism in contemporary France is similarly pessimistic about escaping a 
national and therefore racial subtext in appeals to “the people”. Rather than 
trying to convert voters who identify with right-wing populism it is, Fassin 
suggests, a better strategy to make a specific political appeal to the left that 
can potentially resonate with both racialized majorities and minorities (see 
Fassin et al. 2018). Jean-Luc Mélanchon’s left populism has demonstrated 
that it is in practice very hard to throw out the bathwater of neoliberalism 
without jeopardising the baby of cultural diversity.4
Such criticisms are entirely valid insofar as we conceive of the Western 
nation-state as the normative political framework within which “the people” are 
conceived. If we follow Sadri Khiari in observing that “the notion of people, in 
its modern sense, was constructed in close connection with the social 
production of races by colonization” (Khiari 2016, 90), then it is surely the 
case that Britain’s imperial and post-imperial history of racial formation 
mitigates the possibility of the development of a populism that is not itself 
striated by racism. Even culturally plural definitions of British national identity 
depend on the exclusion of racialized outsiders and on racialized hierarchies 
of belonging (Pitcher 2009). In their reading of Latin American populisms, Cas 
Muddle and Cristóbal Robira Kaltwasser suggest that in relatively poor 
societies like Mexico, Peru and Venezuela populisms “promote the inclusion 
of vast groups which are objectively and subjectively excluded from society”, 
but that in relatively affluent societies “the people” tend to be defined in 
“ethnical” terms (2012, 207).The issue might therefore not be with the theory 
of populism per se but its application to Western or British politics in particular.
The problem of nationalism certainly isn’t going to go away for the politics of 
populism. While Mouffe raises the possibility of escaping nationalist 
determination in her assertion that what’s problematic about populism is not 
the reference to “the people” but “the way in which this ‘people’ is constructed” 
(Mouffe 2005b, 69), her recent work on left populism is somewhat equivocal, 
advocating as it does strategic engagement with the “strong libidinal 
investment” in nationalism and patriotism (Mouffe 2018, 71).5 It is true that 
one of the great advantages of Laclau’s theory is that he understands the 
social as radically heterogeneous: the constitution of ‘the people’ does not 
depend on an underlying or pre-existing category of identification like race, 
nation or class. Yet while can accept in theory that “communities consist of 
discursive spaces, rather than geographical locations” (Laclau 1990, 245) 
there remain practical questions about the current political valency of rival 
deterritorialized conceptions of political community, or of sub-, supra-, or 
trans-national alternatives to the naturalized territory of race and nation.
A defence of antiracist populism
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Although the problem of the racialized nation state is not going to go away for 
the politics of populism, I want to end this article with a modest defence of 
antiracist populism. My contention is that the populist moment we are 
currently experiencing in Britain and beyond is not going to go away any time 
soon, and that appeals to “the people” against an elite will continue to have a 
political resonance for some time to come. It is accordingly imperative that we 
recognize how antiracism fits into all of this. Antiracist populism does not 
provide an answer or response to the racisms of right-wing populism so much 
as act as a heuristic to help us understand how the field of antiracist struggle 
is shaped by our populist moment. It is, in part, out of a need to account for 
the influence of right-wing populism on antiracism that antiracist populism 
continues to be an important problem to think through, and with. 
The key issue that antiracist populism brings to light is this: antiracism comes 
down far too often on the wrong side of the distinction between “people” and 
“elite”. In this article’s account of the pervasive racial common sense that 
right-wing populism has consolidated around Brexit, antiracism is constructed 
as an elite agenda, imposed unwanted on a racist people. When self-
identifying “remainers” criticize populist voters as “ unreasonable’, ‘utopian’, 
‘irrational’, ‘uneducated’, not to say ‘stupid’” (De Cleen et al. 2018), it is not 
hard to see how antiracist voices might help to reinforce this formal distinction 
between people and elite. It is a cleavage that can be deepened, too, by some 
of the antiracism that takes place on social media – an often righteous 
policing of words and behaviours by those who know better. This patrician 
framing has of course long dogged the Labour Party: in 2014, Emily 
Thornberry tended her resignation from Labour’s shadow cabinet after 
tweeting an image widely interpreted as an insinuation of working-class 
racism (see Walsh 2014); in the run-up to the 2010 general election, Gordon 
Brown was castigated for his famous off-camera but inadvertently on-mike 
assessment of a pensioner complaining about immigration as “just a sort of 
bigoted woman” (Sky News 2010). Whether such comments are reasonable 
or justified is besides the point. What matters is their performative affirmation 
of the distinction between people and elite. Antiracism is hereby framed as a 
minority concern, characterised by its political correctness, and elaborated as 
the coalition of threatened minorities and a protective, educated elite.
There are of course significant historical reasons why antiracism has become 
associated with the political establishment. Civil rights struggles, in the UK 
and elsewhere, sought legal change to establish anti-discrimination 
legislation. Racism is recognized in the criminal justice system as a hate 
crime. While antiracism’s institutional struggles are far from complete, there is 
some latitude to recognise racism in the legal system, and by businesses and 
schools, and other institutions like the media. These institutional struggles 
have been very important, but they have helped to reinforce the idea that 
antiracism is an establishment cause. They help to underpin the notion that 
antiracism, deriving from a legal injunction or some symbolic figure of top-
down authority, watches over the people and passes judgment over their 
errors. 
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There are times when right-wing populists have skilfully played on 
antiracism’s legal and institutionalised status in order to reproduce and 
reinforce the political grammar of right-wing populism. In the summer of 2018 
the far right activist known as Tommy Robinson broke court restrictions in the 
reporting of a sexual abuse trial of a number of predominantly South Asian 
heritage men accused of grooming underage girls in the English town of 
Huddersfield (Halliday 2018). Found guilty of contempt of court and jailed for a 
short period of time, Robinson was able to create a story that not only 
confirmed his Islamophobic worldview, but which positioned him as the victim 
of establishment censure. Acting as agent provocateur, Robinson shaped a 
populist narrative in which a liberal, politically correct elite are shielding the 
actions of depraved Muslim men from “the people”. By censoring Robinson’s 
ability to tell his truth about Islamic culture, the elite’s political correctness is 
revealed to be a betrayal of that people. People and power are again 
represented as on opposing sides over the subject of race. For antiracists to 
refuse to condemn Robinson as a racist would be morally inadmissible, but to 
go ahead and condemn him also plays into his hands, amplifying the 
magnitude of his argument and confirming his status as a silenced agent of 
the truth.
It is perhaps around the question of neoliberal labour policies that the 
unintended consequences of antiracist critique have been most sustained. 
Under Labour, Tory and coalition administrations pre-Brexit, the neoliberal 
deregulation of the labour market was combined with much public worrying 
about the impact of immigration on ‘public services’ and ‘social cohesion’ (for 
example, Cabinet Office 2010, 21). In such an atmosphere antiracist voices 
rightly defended migrants from anti-immigrant racism, but in doing so did not 
always criticise the policies that created the conditions for which migrants 
were being blamed. If it is not simultaneously accompanied by the critique of 
restricted labour rights, the legitimate defence of free movement can look a lot 
like the defence of neoliberalism. Antiracism can play an accidental role in 
policing the racist side-effects of unchecked neoliberal governance, and as 
such can again become marked as an elite discourse. 
Antiracist populism, as I have sketched it here, describes a very real need to 
understand and engage on a changed terrain of political practice. These brief 
examples of the way antiracism has been framed as the project of political 
elites indicate some of the challenges antiracism is up against in Brexit’s 
populist political conjuncture. Perhaps above all, they demonstrate that how 
antiracism works and is understood is not fully under the control of self-
identifying antiracists, but rather is shaped by a range of social actors, 
including antiracism’s antagonists on the populist right. I have tried to show 
how a focus on populist form rather than content can prevent antiracists from 
taking for granted the naturalised political grammar of right-wing populism, 
and begin thinking about alternative appeals to the popular will. While it is far 
from straightforward to navigate, engagement on the terrain of the popular is 
not optional if we are to counter the fatalistic tendency to render antiracism as 
a minority or elite concern.
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